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This paper revisits the macroeconomic effects of government consumption in the neoclassical growth
model augmented with idiosyncratic investment (or entrepreneurial) risk. Under complete markets,
a permanent increase in government consumption has no long-run effect on the interest rate, the capital-labor
ratio, and labor productivity, while it increases work hours due to the familiar negative wealth effect.
These results are upset once we allow for incomplete markets. The very same negative wealth effect
now causes a reduction in risk taking and investment.  This in turn leads to a lower risk-free rate and,
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Studying the impact of government spending on macroeconomic outcomes is one of the most cel-
ebrated policy exercises within the neoclassical growth model; it is important for understanding
the business-cycle implications of ﬁscal policy, the macroeconomic eﬀects of wars, and the cross-
section of countries. Some classics include Hall (1980), Barro (1981, 1989), Aiyagari, Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), and McGrattan and Ohanian (1999, 2006).
These studies have all maintained the convenient assumption of complete markets, abstracting
from the possibility that agents’ saving and investment decisions—and hence their reaction to
changes in ﬁscal policy—may crucially depend on the extent of risk sharing within the economy.
This paper contributes towards ﬁlling this gap. It revisits the macroeconomic eﬀects of government
consumption within an incomplete-markets variant of the neoclassical growth model.
Apart from introducing undiversiﬁed idiosyncratic risk in production and investment, all other
ingredients of our model are the same as in the canonical neoclassical growth model: ﬁrms op-
erate neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale technologies, households have standard CRRA/CEIS
preferences, and markets are competitive. The focus on idiosyncratic production/investment risk
is motivated by two considerations. First, this friction is empirically relevant. This is obvious for
less developed economies. But even in the United States, privately-owned ﬁrms account for about
one half of aggregate production and employment. Furthermore, the typical investor—the median
rich household—holds a very undiversiﬁed portfolio, more than one half of which is allocated to
private equity.1 And second, as we explain next, this friction upsets some key predictions of the
standard neoclassical paradigm.
In the standard neoclassical paradigm, the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio, pro-
ductivity (output per work hour), the wage rate, and the interest rate, are all pinned down by the
equality of the marginal product of capital with the discount rate in preferences. As a result, any
change in the level of government consumption, even if it is permanent, has no eﬀect on the long-run
values of these variables.2 On the other hand, because higher spending for the government means
lower wealth for the households, a permanent increase in government consumption raises labor
supply. It follows that employment (work hours) and output increase both in the short run and in
the long run, so as to keep the long-run levels of capital intensity and productivity unchanged.
The picture is quite diﬀerent once we allow for incomplete markets. The same wealth eﬀect
that, in response to an increase in government consumption, stimulates labor supply in the stan-
dard paradigm, now also discourages investment. This is simply because risk taking, and hence
1See Quadrini (2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Carroll (2000), and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).
Also note that idiosyncratic investment risks need not be limited to private entrepreneurs; they may also aﬀect
educational and occupational choices, or the production decisions that CEO’s make on behalf of public corporations.
2This, of course, presumes that the change in government consumption is ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes. The
eﬃciency or redistributive considerations behind optimal taxation is beyond the scope of this paper.
1investment, is sensitive to wealth. We thus ﬁnd very diﬀerent long-run eﬀects. First, a permanent
increase in government consumption necessarily reduces the risk-free interest rate. And second,
unless the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low enough, it also reduces the capital-labor
ratio, productivity, and wages.
The eﬀect on the risk-free rate is an implication of the precautionary motive: a higher level
of consumption for the government implies a lower aggregate level of wealth for the households,
which is possible in steady state only with a lower interest rate. A lower interest rate, however,
does not necessarily imply a higher capital-labor ratio. This is because market incompleteness
introduces a wedge between the risk-free rate and the marginal product of capital. Furthermore,
because of diminishing absolute risk aversion, the lower the level of wealth, the higher will be the
risk premium on investment, and hence this wedge. It follows that, in response to an increase in
government consumption, the capital-labor ratio can fall even if the interest rate also falls. Indeed,
a suﬃcient condition for this to be the case is that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
suﬃciently high relative to the income share of capital—a condition easily satisﬁed for plausible
calibrations of the model.
Turning to employment and output, there are two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, as
with complete markets, the negative wealth eﬀect on labor supply contributes towards higher
employment and output. On the other hand, unlike complete markets, the reduction in capital
intensity, productivity, and wages contributes towards lower employment and output. Depending
on the income and wage elasticities of labor supply, either of the two eﬀects can dominate.
The deviation from the standard paradigm is signiﬁcant, not only qualitatively, but also quan-
titatively. For our preferred parametrizations of the model, the following hold. First, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is comfortably above the critical value that suﬃces for an increase in
government consumption to reduce the long-run levels of the capital-labor ratio, productivity, and
wages. Second, the negative eﬀects on these variables are quantitatively signiﬁcant: a 1% increase
in government spending under incomplete markets has the same impact on capital intensity and
labor productivity as a 0.5% − 0.6% increase in capital-income taxation under complete markets.
Third, these eﬀects mitigate, but do not fully oﬀset, the wealth eﬀect on labor supply. Finally, the
welfare consequences are non-trivial: the welfare cost of a permanent 1% increase in government
consumption is three times larger under incomplete markets than under complete markets.
The main contribution of the paper is thus to highlight how wealth eﬀects on investment due
to ﬁnancial frictions can signiﬁcantly modify the supply-side channel of ﬁscal policy. In our model,
these wealth eﬀects emerge from idiosyncratic risk along with diminishing absolute risk aversion; in
other models, they could emerge from borrowing constraints. Also, such wealth eﬀects are relevant
for both neoclassical and Keynesian models. In this paper we follow the neoclassical tradition,
not because of any belief on which paradigm best ﬁts the data, but rather because this clariﬁes
2the value of our contribution: whereas wealth eﬀects are central to the neoclassical approach with
regard to labor supply, they have been mute with regard to investment.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to study the macroeconomic eﬀects of gov-
ernment consumption in an incomplete-markets version of the neoclassical growth paradigm.3 The
particular framework we employ for this purpose is a continuous-time variant of the one introduced
in Angeletos (2007). That paper studied how idiosyncratic capital-income risk aﬀects aggregate
saving, and contrasted this with the impact of labor-income risk in Bewley type models (Aiyagari,
1994; Huggett, 1997; Krusell and Smith, 1998). Other papers that introduce idiosyncratic invest-
ment or entrepreneurial risk in the neoclassical growth model include Angeletos and Calvet (2006),
Buera and Shin (2007), Caggeti and De Nardi (2006), Covas (2006), and Meh and Quadrini (2006).4
The novelty of our paper is to study the implications for ﬁscal policy in such an environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, Section 3
characterizes its equilibrium, and Section 4 analyzes its steady state. The basic model ﬁxes labor
supply so as to focus on the most novel results of the paper, namely the steady-state eﬀects of
government consumption on the interest rate and the capital-labor ratio. Section 5 then turns to
three extensions that endogenize labor supply. Section 6 examines the dynamic response of the
economy to a permanent change in government consumption. Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic model
Time is continuous, indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households,
indexed by i and distributed uniformly over [0,1]. Each household is endowed with one unit of
labor, which it supplies inelastically in a competitive labor market. Each household also owns and
runs a ﬁrm, which employs labor in the competitive labor market but can only use the capital stock
invested by the particular household.5 Households cannot invest in other households’ ﬁrms and
cannot otherwise diversify away from the shocks hitting their ﬁrms, but can freely trade a riskless
bond. Finally, all uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic, and hence all aggregates are deterministic.
3A related, but diﬀerent, exercise is conducted in Heathcote (2005). That paper studies the impact of a change
in the timing of taxes in a Bewley-type model like Aiyagari’s (1994), where borrowing constraints limit the ability
of households to smooth consumption, thus breaking Ricardian equivalence, but where market incompleteness does
not impact the production side of the economy. In our paper, instead, the key friction is on the production side.
Moreover, deviations from Ricardian equivalence are not considered: our model allows households to freely trade a
riskless bond, thus ensuring that the timing of taxes has no eﬀect on allocations.
4Related is also Obstfeld (1994), which assumes a continuous-time Epstein-Zin speciﬁcation as this paper, but
with an AK technology.
5We can think of a household as a couple, with the wife running the family business and the husband working
in the competitive labor market (or vice versa). The key assumption, of course, is only that the value of the labor
endowment of each household is pinned down by the competitive wage and is not subject to idiosyncratic risk.
32.1 Households and ﬁrms
The ﬁnancial wealth of household i, denoted by xi
t, is the sum of its holdings in private capital, ki
t,






The evolution of xi




t + ωt − Tt − ci
t]dt, (2)
where dπi
t is the household’s capital income (i.e., the proﬁts it enjoys from the private ﬁrm it owns),
Rt is the interest rate on the riskless bond, ωt is the wage rate, Tt is the lump-sum tax, and ci
t is
the household’s consumption. Finally, the familiar no-Ponzi game condition is also imposed.
Whereas the sequences of prices and taxes are deterministic (due to the absence of aggregate











t is the amount of labor the ﬁrm hires in the competitive labor market, F is a constant-
returns-to-scale neoclassical production function, and δ is the mean depreciation rate. Idiosyncratic
risk is introduced through dzi
t, a standard Wiener process that is i.i.d. across agents and across time.
This can be interpreted either as a stochastic depreciation shock or as a stochastic productivity
shock, the key element being that it generates risk in the return to capital. The scalar σ measures the
amount of undiversiﬁed idiosyncratic risk and can be viewed as an index of market incompleteness,
with higher σ corresponding to a lower degree of risk sharing (and σ = 0 corresponding to complete
markets). Finally, without serious loss of generality, we assume a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for
the technology: F(k,n) = kαn1−α with α ∈ (0,1).6
Turning to preferences, we assume an Epstein-Zin speciﬁcation with constant elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (CEIS) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Given a consumption














− (1 − γ)U

. (5)
6The characterization of equilibrium and the proof of the existence of the steady state extend to any neoclassical
production function; it is only the proof of the uniqueness of the steady state that uses the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
4Here, β > 0 is the discount rate, γ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and θ > 0 is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution.7
Standard expected utility is nested with γ = 1/θ. We ﬁnd it useful to allow θ  = 1/γ in order
to clarify that the qualitative properties of the steady state depend crucially on the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution rather than the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (which in turn also
guides our preferred parameterizations of the model). However, none of our results rely on allowing
θ  = 1/γ. A reader who feels uncomfortable with the Epstein-Zin speciﬁcation can therefore ignore
it, assume instead standard expected utility, and simply replace γ with 1/θ (or vice versa) in all
the formulas that follow.
2.2 Government
At each point in time the government consumes output at the rate Gt. Government spending
is deterministic, it is ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxation, and it does not aﬀect either utility from





t + Tt − Gt]dt, (6)
where B
g
t denotes the level of government assets (i.e., minus the level of government debt). Finally,
a no-Ponzi game condition is imposed to rule out explosive debt accumulation.
2.3 Equilibrium deﬁnition
The initial position of the economy is given by the distribution of (ki
0,bi
0) across households. House-




t}t∈[0,∞), contingent on the history of their idiosyncratic shocks, and
given the price sequence and the government policy, so as to maximize their lifetime utility. Id-
iosyncratic risk, however, washes out in the aggregate. We thus deﬁne an equilibrium as a de-
terministic sequence of prices {ωt,Rt}t∈[0,∞), a deterministic sequence of policies {Gt,Tt}t∈[0,∞),





t}t∈[0,∞))i∈[0,1], such that the following conditions hold: (i) given the sequences of









t = 0, in all t; (iv) the government budget is satisﬁed











t), in all t.8
7To make sure that (4) indeed deﬁnes a preference ordering over consumption lotteries, one must establish existence
and uniqueness of the solution to the integral equation (4); see Duﬃe and Epstein (1992).
8Throughout,
 
i denotes expectation in the cross-section of the population.
53 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the economy. We ﬁrst solve for a household’s
optimal plan for given sequences of prices and policies. We then aggregate across households and
derive the general-equilibrium dynamics.
3.1 Individual behavior
Since employment is chosen after the capital stock has been installed and the idiosyncratic shock
has been observed, optimal employment maximizes proﬁts state by state. By constant returns to
scale, optimal ﬁrm employment and proﬁts are linear in own capital:
ni
t = ¯ n(ωt)ki
t and dπi
t = ¯ r(ωt)ki
tdt + σdzi
t, (7)
where ¯ n(ωt) ≡ argmaxn[F(1,n) − ωtn] and ¯ r(ωt) ≡ maxn [F(1,n) − ωtn] − δ. Here, ¯ rt ≡ ¯ r(ωt) is
the household’s expectation of the return to its capital prior to the realization of the idiosyncratic
shock zi
t, as well as the mean of the realized returns in the cross-section of ﬁrms. Analogous
interpretation applies to ¯ nt ≡ ¯ n(ωt).
The key result here is that households face risky, but linear, returns to their capital. To see
how this translates to linearity of wealth in assets, let ht denote the present discounted value of






t Rjdj(ωs − Ts)ds. (8)
Next, deﬁne eﬀective wealth as the sum of ﬁnancial and human wealth:
wi
t ≡ xi
t + ht = ki
t + bi
t + ht. (9)
It follows that the evolution of eﬀective wealth can be described by
dwi
t = [¯ rtki
t + Rt(bi




The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (10) measures the expected rate of growth in the household’s
eﬀective wealth; the second term captures the impact of idiosyncratic risk.
The linearity of budgets together with the homotheticity of preferences ensures that, for given
prices and policies, the household’s consumption-saving problem reduces to a tractable homothetic
problem as in Samuelson’s and Merton’s classic portfolio analysis. It follows that the optimal policy
rules are linear in wealth, as shown in the next proposition.
6Proposition 1. Let {ωt,Rt}t∈[0,∞) and {Gt,Tt}t∈[0,∞) be equilibrium price and policy sequences.






t = (1 − φt)wi
t − ht, (11)
where φt, the fraction of eﬀective wealth invested in capital, is given by
φt =
¯ rt − Rt
γσ2 , (12)
while mt, the marginal propensity to consume out of eﬀective wealth, satisﬁes the recursion
˙ mt
mt
= mt + (θ − 1)ˆ ρt − θβ, (13)
with ˆ ρt ≡ ρt − 1
2γφ2
tσ2 denoting the risk-adjusted return to saving and ρt ≡ φt¯ rt + (1 − φt)Rt the
mean return to saving.
Condition (12) simply says that the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is increasing in
the risk premium  t ≡ ¯ rt−Rt, and decreasing in risk aversion γ and the amount of risk σ.9 Condition
(13) is essentially the Euler condition: it describes the growth rate of the marginal propensity
to consume as a function of the anticipated path of risk-adjusted returns to saving. Whether
higher risk-adjusted returns increase or reduce the marginal propensity to consume depends on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To see this more clearly, note that in steady state this
condition reduces to m = θβ − (θ − 1) ˆ ρ, so that higher ˆ ρ decreases m (i.e., increases saving out of
eﬀective wealth) if and only if θ > 1. This is due to the familiar income and substitution eﬀects.
3.2 General equilibrium
Because individual consumption, saving and investment are linear in individual wealth, aggregates
at any point in time do not depend on the extent of wealth inequality at that time. As a result,
the aggregate equilibrium dynamics can be described with a low-dimensional recursive system.
Deﬁne f(K) ≡ F(K,1) as the production in intensive form and let ω(K) ≡ f(K) − f′(K)K,
φ(K,R) ≡ 1
γσ2 (f′(K) − δ − R), and ρ(K,R) ≡ R + 1
γσ2 (f′(K) − δ − R)
2. Aggregating across the
policy rules of the agents and imposing market clearing, we arrive at the following proposition.
9Clearly, in any equilibrium µt must be positive, otherwise nobody would invest in capital and an equilibrium
would fail to exist.
7Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the aggregate dynamics satisfy
˙ Kt = f (Kt) − δKt − Ct − Gt (14)
˙ Ct
Ct
= θ (ρt − β) − (θ − 1) 1
2γσ2φ2
t (15)





with ωt = ω(Kt), φt = φ(Kt,Rt), and ρt = ρ(Kt,Rt).
Condition (14) is the resource constraint of the economy. The resource constraint does not
depend on the degree of market incompleteness. It follows from aggregating budgets across all
households and the government, imposing labor- and bond-market clearing, and using the linearity












Condition (15) is the aggregate Euler condition for the economy. It follows from aggregating
consumption and wealth across agents together with the optimality condition (13) for the marginal
propensity to consume. It also has a simple interpretation. As in the case of complete markets,
aggregate consumption growth unambiguously increases with ρt, the mean return to saving. But
unlike complete markets, aggregate consumption growth now also depends on 1
2γσ2φ2
t, a risk-
adjustment term. Whether more risk contributes to a lower or higher marginal propensity to save,
and hence whether this new term contributes to lower or higher consumption growth, depends on
whether the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, θ, is higher or lower than 1. The intuition
for this property is the same as the intuition for the impact of the interest rate in a deterministic
saving problem, namely the opposing income and substitution eﬀects of a higher rate of return to
saving.
Condition (16) expresses the evolution of the present value of aggregate net-of-taxes labor
income in recursive form. It follows from the deﬁnition of human wealth combined with the in-
tertemporal government budget, which imposes that the present value of taxes equals the present
value of government consumption.
Finally, condition (17) follows from bond-market clearing. More precisely, aggregating bond
holdings across agents and imposing bond-market clearing gives (1 − φt)Wt − Ht = 0, while aggre-
gating investment gives Kt = φtWt, and combining the two gives condition (17).
These conditions characterize the equilibrium dynamics of the economy with either incomplete
or complete markets. In both cases, condition (17) ensures that φt ∈ (0,1). But when markets are
complete (σ = 0), this is possible only if f′ (Kt)−δ = Rt (meaning arbitrage between bonds and cap-
ital). Condition (15) then reduces to the more familiar Euler condition ˙ Ct/Ct = θ [f′ (Kt) − δ − β],
8and one can track the dynamics of the economy merely on the (C,K) space, using the Euler con-
dition and the resource constraint. When, instead, markets are incomplete, φt ∈ (0,1) is possible
only if f′(Kt)−δ > Rt, which proves that the marginal product of capital must exceed the risk-free
rate. Moreover, the dimensionality of the system now increases by one: along with (C,K), we also
have to keep track of H, using condition (16).
Still, this is a highly tractable dynamic system, as compared to other incomplete-markets mod-
els, where the entire wealth distribution—an inﬁnite dimensional object—is a relevant state variable
for aggregate equilibrium dynamics. Indeed, the equilibrium dynamics can be approximated with
a simple shooting algorithm: for any historically given K0, guess some initial values (C0,H0) and
use conditions (14)-(16) to compute the entire path of (Ct,Kt,Ht) for t ∈ [0,T], for some large T;
then iterate on the initial guess till (CT,KT,HT) is close enough to its steady-state value.10 In the
special case that θ = 1 (unit EIS), mt = β and hence Ct = β(Kt +Ht) for all t. One can then drop
the Euler condition from the dynamic system and analyze the equilibrium dynamics with a simple
phase diagram in the (K,H) space.
4 Steady State
In this section we study the steady state of the economy (i.e., the ﬁxed point of the dynamic system
in Proposition 2) and its comparative statics with respect to the level of government spending.
4.1 Characterization
Clearly, an equilibrium would fail to exist if the present value of government spending exceeded
that of labor income. We thus henceforth parameterize government spending Gt as a fraction g of
aggregate output Yt and impose 0 ≤ g < 1 − α.
Proposition 3. (i) The steady state exists and is unique. (ii) In steady state, the capital stock K
and the interest rate R are the unique solution to
f′(K) − δ = R +
 






(1 − α − g)f(K)
R
(19)
Output is then given by Y = f(K), the wage rate by ω = (1 − α)f(K), and consumption by
C = (1 − g)f(K) − δK.
10This presumes that a turnpike theorem applies; this is likely to be the case at least for σ small enough, by
continuity to the complete-markets case.
9Condition (18) follows from the Euler condition (15), setting ˙ C = 0. Condition (19) follows
from the bond market clearing condition (17), substituting for the steady-state value of H implied
by (16), namely H = (ω − G)/R = (1 − α − g)f(K)/R.
To better understand the determination of the steady state of our economy, consider for a
moment another economy that has the same preferences, technologies and risks but is open to
an international market for the riskless bond, thus facing an exogenously ﬁxed interest rate. If
R ≥ 1/β, then the precautionary saving motive implies that aggregate wealth increases without
bound. If, instead, R ∈ (0,1/β), then diminishing absolute aversion ensures the existence of a ﬁnite
level of aggregate wealth at which the precautionary motive is just oﬀset by the gap between the
interest rate and the discount rate.11 Therefore, R ∈ (0,1/β) is both necessary and suﬃcient for
the open economy to admit a steady state. For any such R, aggregate capital is given by (18).
There is, however, a unique R for which the net foreign asset position of the economy is zero, which
is precisely what condition (19) imposes.
4.2 A graphical representation
Let K1(R) and K2(R;g) denote the solutions to, respectively, conditions (18) and (19) with respect
to K. For any given g, the intersection of the graphs of these two functions identiﬁes the steady
state. To understand how these graphs look like, the next lemma examines the monotonicities of
these two functions with respect to R.
Lemma 1. (i) ∂K1/∂R > 0 if and only if θ >
φ
1−φ. (ii) ∂K2/∂R < 0 always.
The intuition behind part (ii) is simple. For given K, and hence given ω, an increase in R
reduces both H and φ(K,R), and thereby necessarily reduces the right hand side of (19). But
then for (19) to hold with the lower R it must be that K also falls. It follows that K2(R) is a
monotonically decreasing function, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The intuition behind part (i) is a bit more convoluted. Recall that condition (18) comes from
stationarity of aggregate consumption. Clearly, this is equivalent to imposing stationarity of ag-
gregate wealth. Since ˙ Wt = ρtWt −Ct = (ρt − mt)Wt, this in turn is the same as imposing ρ = m.
From condition (13), on the other hand, we have that the steady-state value of the marginal propen-
sity to consume is given by m = θβ −(θ −1)ˆ ρ. It follows that aggregate wealth is stationary if and
only if
ρ + (θ − 1)ˆ ρ = θβ, (20)
where ρ is the mean return to saving and ˆ ρ the risk adjusted return (both evaluated at the steady
state K and for given R). Of course, this condition is equivalent to (18), but it is more useful for
developing intuition.






Figure 1. The steady state and the eﬀects of higher government spending.
First, note that an increase in K necessarily reduces ρ+(θ−1)ˆ ρ. To see this, note that an increase
in K reduces f′ (K). For given φ, this reduces ρ and ˆ ρ equally, thus also reducing ρ + (θ − 1)ˆ ρ. Of
course, the optimal φ must fall, but this only reinforces the negative eﬀect on ρ (since the portfolio
is shifted towards the low-return bond), while it does not aﬀect ˆ ρ (because of the envelope theorem
and the fact that φ maximizes ˆ ρ).
Next, note that an increase in R has an ambiguous eﬀect on ρ + (θ − 1)ˆ ρ. For given φ, both ρ
and ˆ ρ increase with R. But now the fact that φ falls works in the opposite direction, contributing
to lower ρ. Intuitively, though, this eﬀect should be small if φ was small to start with. Moreover,
the impact of ˆ ρ is likely to dominate if θ is high. We thus expect ρ+(θ −1)ˆ ρ to increase with R if
and only if either φ is low or θ is high. Indeed, we prove that this is the case if and only if θ >
φ
1−φ.
Combining the above observations, we conclude that ∂K1/∂R > 0 if and only if θ >
φ
1−φ, which
completes the argument behind part (i) of Lemma 1.
In the Appendix, we further show that the steady-state φ is a decreasing function of R. Hence,
the condition θ >
φ
1−φ is satisﬁed if and only if R is high enough. It follows that K1 (R) is a
U-shaped curve, as illustrated in Figure 1. Intuitively, when R is close to β, a marginal increase
in R has such a strong positive eﬀect on steady state wealth, that the consequent reduction in the
risk premium more than oﬀsets the increase in the opportunity cost of investment, ensuring that
K increases with R.
As noted earlier, the intersection of the two curves identiﬁes the steady state of the closed
economy. The existence and uniqueness of such an intersection is established in the Appendix (see
the proof of Proposition 3). What we next seek to understand is how this intersection changes with
an increase in government spending.
114.3 The long-run eﬀects of government consumption
Because g does not enter condition (18), an increase in government consumption does not aﬀect
the K1 curve. On the other hand, because higher g means lower net-of-taxes labor income, and
hence lower H, an increase in government consumption causes the K2 curve to shift downwards,
as illustrated in Figure 1. This is simply a manifestation of the negative wealth eﬀect of higher
lump-sum taxes. Clearly, R unambiguously falls, whereas the impact on K depends on whether
the two curves intersect in the upward or the downward portion of the K1 curve. From part (i) of
Lemma 1 we know that the intersection occurs in the upward portion if and only if θ >
φ
1−φ. The
main result of the paper is then immediate.
Proposition 4. In steady state, higher government consumption (g) necessarily decreases the risk-
free rate (R), while it also decreases the capital-labor ratio (K/N), labor productivity (Y/N), the





With complete markets, the steady state interest rate is equated to the discount rate (R = β),
and the steady state capital-labor ratio is determined by the equality of the marginal product
of capital to the discount rate (f′ (K/N) − δ = β). It follows that, in the long run, government
consumption has no eﬀect on either R or K/N, Y/N, ω, and s.12
Here, instead, government consumption can have non-trivial long-run eﬀects, even if ﬁnanced
with lump-sum taxation. Because households face consumption risk, they have a precautionary mo-
tive to save. Because preferences exhibit diminishing absolute risk aversion, this motive is stronger
when the level of wealth is lower. It follows that, by reducing household wealth, higher government
spending stimulates precautionary saving. But then the risk-free rate at which aggregate saving
can be stationary has to be lower, which proves that R falls with g.13
The impact of this fall in R on the capital-labor ratio now depends on two opposing eﬀects.
On the one hand, because of diminishing absolute risk aversion, a lower level of wealth implies a
lower willingness to take risk, which tends to discourage investment. On the other hand, a lower
risk-free rate implies a lower opportunity cost of investment, which tends to stimulate investment.
As explained earlier, the wealth eﬀect dominates when θ >
φ
1−φ.14 Since φ < α, this is the case as
long as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high relative to the income share of capital.
12This result is true even when labor supply is endogenous (as in Section 5). The only diﬀerence is that in the
latter case, while K/N and Y/N continue to not change, N changes and hence K and Y also change.
13A similar intuition underlies the steady-state supply of saving in Aiyagari (1994).
14In the Appendix we prove that the steady-state φ is a decreasing function of the stead-state R, and hence an
increasing function of g. It follows that, whenever the steady-state K is a non-monotonic function of g, it is a
U-shaped function of g. Note, however, that a high enough θ may suﬃce for θ to be higher than φ/(1 − φ) for all
feasible levels of g, and hence for K to be a globally decreasing function of g.
12For empirically plausible calibrations of the model, the condition θ >
φ
1−φ is easily satisﬁed. For
example, take the interest rate to be R = 4% and labor income to be 65% of GDP. Then H is about




H, this exercise gives a calibrated value for
φ
1−φ about 0.25. This is far lower than most
of the recent empirical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which are typically
around 1 if not higher.15 It follows that a negative long-run eﬀect of government consumption on
aggregate saving and productivity appears to be the most likely scenario.
4.4 Numerical simulation
We now numerically simulate the steady state of our economy, to get a ﬁrst pass at the potential
quantitative importance of our results.
The economy is fully parameterized by (α,β,γ,δ,θ,σ,g), where α is the income share of capital,
β is the discount factor, γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, δ is the (mean) depreciation
rate, θ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, σ is the standard deviation of the rate of
return on private investment, and g is the share of government consumption in aggregate output.
In our baseline parametrization, we take α = 0.36, β = 0.96, and δ = 0.08; these values
are standard in the literature. For risk aversion, we take γ = 5, a value commonly used in the
macro-ﬁnance literature to help generate plausible risk premia. For the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, we take θ = 1, a value consistent with recent micro and macro estimates.16 For
the share of government, our baseline value is g = 25% (as in the United States) and a higher
alternative is g = 40% (as in some European countries).
What remains is σ. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of the rate-of-return risk faced by
the “typical” investor in the US economy. However, there are various indications that investment
risks are signiﬁcant. For instance, the probability that a privately held ﬁrm survives ﬁve years after
entry is less than 40%. Furthermore, even conditional on survival, the risks faced by entrepreneurs
and private investors appear to be very large: as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) docu-
ment, not only there is a dramatic cross-sectional variation in the returns to private equity, but
also the volatility of the book value of a (value-weighted) index of private ﬁrms is twice as large
as that of the index of public ﬁrms—one more indication that private equity is more risky than
public equity. Note then that the standard deviation of annual returns is about 15% per annum
for the entire pool of public ﬁrms; it is over 50% for a single public ﬁrm (which gives a measure of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk); and it is about 40% for a portfolio of the smallest public ﬁrms (which are likely
to be similar to large private ﬁrms).
15 See, for example, Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003), Mulligan (2002), and Gruber (2005). See also Guvenen
(2006) and Angeletos (2007) for related discussions on the parametrization of the EIS.
16See the references in footnote 15.
13Given this suggestive evidence, and in want of a better alternative, we take σ = 30% for our
baseline parameterization and consider σ = 20% and σ = 40% for sensitivity analysis. Although
these numbers are somewhat arbitrary, the following observation is reassuring: the volatility of
individual consumption generated by our model is comparable to its empirical counterpart. For in-
stance, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2006) estimate the standard deviation of consumption growth to be about 8% for stockholders
(and about 3% for non-stockholders). Similarly, using data that include consumption of luxury
goods, A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2001) get estimates between 6% and 15%. In our simula-
tions, on the other hand, the standard deviation of individual consumption growth is less than 5%
per annum (along the steady state).
Putting aside these qualiﬁcations about the parametrization of σ, we now examine the quan-
titative eﬀects of government consumption on the steady state of the economy. Table 1 reports
the per-cent reduction in the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio (K/N), labor produc-
tivity (Y/N), and the saving rate (s), relative to what their values would have been if g were 0.17
Complete markets are indicated by CM and incomplete markets by IM.
K/N Y/N s τk
equiv
CM IM CM IM CM IM CM
baseline 0 −10.02 0 −3.73 0 −1.14 17
σ = 40% 0 −12.18 0 −4.57 0 −1.21 20
σ = 20% 0 −6.78 0 −2.5 0 −0.88 12
g = 40% 0 −17.82 0 −6.82 0 −2.05 28
Table 1. The steady-state eﬀects of the size of government.
In our baseline parametrization, the capital-labor ratio is about 10% lower when g = 25% than
when g = 0. Similarly, productivity is about 4% lower and the saving rate is about 1 percentage
point lower. These are signiﬁcant eﬀects. They are larger (in absolute value) than the steady-state
eﬀects of precautionary saving reported in Aiyagari (1994). They are equivalent to what would be
the steady-state eﬀects of a marginal tax on capital income equal to 17% in the complete-markets
case. (The tax rate on capital income that would generate the same eﬀects under complete markets
is given in the last column of the table, as τk
equiv.)
Not surprisingly, the eﬀects are smaller if σ is lower (third row) or if γ is lower (not reported),
because then risk matters less. On the other hand, the eﬀects are larger when g = 40% (ﬁnal
row): productivity is almost 18% lower, the saving rate is 2 percentage points lower, and the tax
on capital income that would have generated the same eﬀects under complete markets is 28%.
17Here, since labor supply is exogenously ﬁxed, the changes in K and Y coincide with those in K/N and Y/N; this
is not the case in the extensions with endogenous labor supply in the next section.
14Table 2 turns from level to marginal eﬀects: it reports the change in K/N, Y/N, and s as we
increase government spending by 1 percent, either from 25% to 26%, or from 40% to 41%. In the
ﬁrst case, productivity falls by 0.19%; in the second, by 0.26%. This is equivalent to what would
have been under complete markets the eﬀect of increasing the tax rate on capital income by about
0.75 percentage points in the ﬁrst case, and about 0.8 percentage points in the second case.
K/N Y/N τk
equiv
CM IM CM IM CM
g = 25% → 26% 0 −0.52 0 −0.19 0.75
g = 40% → 41% 0 −0.71 0 −0.26 0.8
Table 2. Long-run eﬀects of a permanent 1% increase in government consumption.
5 Endogenous labor
In this section we endogenize labor supply in the economy. We consider three alternative speciﬁ-
cations that achieve this goal without compromising the tractability of the model.
5.1 GHH preferences
One easy way to accommodate endogenous labor supply in the model is to assume preferences
that rule out income eﬀects on labor supply, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1998). In




1−γ [ct + v(lt)]
1−γ , (22)
where lt denotes leisure and v is a strictly concave, strictly increasing function.18 The analysis can
then proceed as in the benchmark model, with labor supply in period t given by Nt = 1 − l(ωt),
where l(ω) ≡ argmaxl {v (l) − ωl}.
This speciﬁcation highlights an important diﬀerence between complete and incomplete markets
with regard to the employment impact of ﬁscal shocks. Under incomplete markets, an increase
in government spending can have a negative general-equilibrium eﬀect on aggregate employment.
This is never possible with complete markets, but it is possible with incomplete markets when an
increase in g reduces the capital-labor ratio, and thereby the wage rate, which in turn discourages
labor supply. Indeed, with GHH preferences, θ >
φ
1−φ suﬃces for both K/N and N to fall with g
in both the short run and the long run.
18To allow for θ  = 1/γ, we let Ut = Et
  ∞
t z(cτ + v(lτ),Uτ)dτ, with the function z deﬁned as in condition (5).
15Although it is unlikely that wealth eﬀects on labor supply are zero in the long run, they may
well be very weak in the short run. In the light of our results, one may then expect that after a
positive shock to government consumption both employment and investment could drop on impact
under incomplete markets.19
5.2 KPR preferences
A second tractable way to accommodate endogenous labor supply is to assume that agents have
homothetic preferences over consumption and leisure, as in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). In









where lt denotes leisure and ψ ∈ (0,1) is a scalar.20
The beneﬁt of this speciﬁcation is that it is standard in the literature (making our results
comparable to previously reported results), while it also comes with zero cost in tractability once
augmented with the assumption that agents can trade leisure with one another.21 The homo-
theticity of the household’s optimization problem is then preserved and the equilibrium analysis
proceeds in a similar fashion as in the benchmark model.22 The only essential novelty is that







The neoclassical eﬀect of wealth on labor supply is now captured by the negative relationship
between Nt and Ct (for given ωt).
For the quantitative version of this economy, in line with King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), we take ψ = 0.75. This value ensures that the steady-state
fraction of available time worked approximately matches the US data. The rest of the parameters
are as in the baseline speciﬁcation of the benchmark model.
5.3 Hand-to-mouth workers
A third approach is to split the population into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of the house-
holds that have been modeled in the benchmark model; we will call this group the “investors”.
19This discussion indicates that an interesting extension might be to consider a preference speciﬁcation that allows
for weak short-run but strong long-run wealth eﬀects, as in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006).






τ ,Uτ)dτ, with z deﬁned as in (5).
21Clearly, this last assumption is for modeling convenience: it allows individual leisure to increase proportionally
with individual wealth.
22The proofs are available upon request.
16The second group consists of households that supply labor but do not hold any assets, and simply
consume their entire labor income at each point in time; we will call this group the “hand-to-mouth







t denotes the consumption of these agents, ǫω > 0 parameterizes the wage elasticity of
labor supply, and ǫc > 0 parameterizes the wealth elasticity.23
This approach could be justiﬁed on its own merit. In the United States, a signiﬁcant fraction of
the population holds no assets, has limited ability to borrow, and sees its consumption tracking its
income almost one-to-one. This fact calls for a richer model of heterogeneity than our benchmark
model. But is unclear what the “right” model for these households is. Our speciﬁcation with
hand-to-mouth workers is a crude way of capturing this form of heterogeneity in the model while
preserving its tractability.
A side beneﬁt of this approach is that it also gives freedom in parameterizing the wage and
wealth elasticities of labor supply. Whereas the KPR preference speciﬁcation imposes ǫω = −ǫc = 1,
the speciﬁcation introduced above permits us to pick much lower elasticities, consistent with micro
evidence. The point is not to argue which parametrization of the labor-supply elasticities is more
appropriate for quantitative exercises within the neoclassical growth model; this is the subject of a
long debate in the literature, to which we have nothing to add. The point here is rather to cover a
broader spectrum of empirically plausible quantitative results.
For the quantitative version of this economy, we thus take ǫω = 0.25 and ǫc = −0.25, which
are in the middle of most micro estimates.24 What then remains is the fraction of aggregate
income absorbed by hand-to-mouth workers. As mentioned above, a signiﬁcant fraction of the US
population holds no assets. For example, using data from both the PSID and the SCF, Guvenen
(2006) reports that the lower 80% of the wealth distribution owns only 12% of aggregate wealth and
accounts for about 70% of aggregate consumption. Since some households may be able to smooth
consumption even when their net worth is zero, 70% is likely to be an upper bound for the fraction
of aggregate consumption accounted for by hand-to-mouth agents. We thus opt to calibrate the
economy so that hand-to-mouth agents account for 50% of aggregate consumption. This is also the
value of the relevant parameter that one would estimate if the model were to match US aggregate
consumption data—we can deduce this from Campbell and Mankiw (1989).25




t , for appropriate ζc,ζn.
24See, for example, Hausman (1981), MaCurdy (1981), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
25Note that the speciﬁcation of aggregate consumption considered in Campbell and Mankiw coincides with the
one implied by our model. Therefore, if one were to run their regression on data generated by our model, one would
correctly identify the fraction of aggregate consumption accounted for by hand-to-mouth workers in our model. This
implies that it is indeed appropriate to calibrate our model’s relevant parameter to Campbell and Mankiw’s estimate.
175.4 The long-run eﬀects of government consumption with endogenous labor
Our main theoretical result (Proposition 4) continues to hold in all of the above variants of the
benchmark model: in steady state, a higher rate g of government consumption necessarily reduces
the interest rate R; and it also reduces the capital-labor ratio K/N, labor productivity Y/N, and
the wage rate ω if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution θ is higher than
φ
1−φ.26
What is not clear anymore is the eﬀect of g on K and Y , because now N is not ﬁxed. On the
one hand, the reduction in wealth stimulates labor supply, thus contributing to an increase in N.
This is the familiar neoclassical eﬀect of government spending on labor supply. On the other hand,
as long as θ >
φ
1−φ, the reduction in capital intensity depresses real wages, contributing towards a
reduction in N. This is the novel general-equilibrium eﬀect due to incomplete markets. The overall
eﬀect of government spending on aggregate employment is therefore ambiguous under incomplete
markets, whereas it is unambiguously positive under complete markets.
Other things equal, we expect the negative general-equilibrium eﬀect to dominate, thus leading
to a reduction in long-run employment after a permanent increase in government spending, if the
wage elasticity of labor supply is suﬃciently high relative to its income elasticity. This is clear
in the GHH speciﬁcation, where the wealth eﬀect is zero. It can also be veriﬁed for the case of
hand-to-mouth workers, where we have freedom in choosing these elasticities, but not in the case
of KPR preferences, where both elasticities are restricted to equal one.
Given these theoretical ambiguities, we now seek to get a sense of empirically plausible quanti-
tative eﬀects. As already discussed, the GHH case (zero wealth eﬀects on labor supply) is merely
of pedagogical value. We thus focus on the parameterized versions of the other two cases, the
economy with KPR (homothetic) preferences and the economy with hand-to-mouth workers.
Table 3 then presents the marginal eﬀects on the steady-state levels of the capital-labor ratio,
productivity, employment, and output for each of these two economies, as g increases from 25%
to 26%, or from 40% to 41%.27 The case of KPR preferences is indicated by KPR, while the case
with hand-to-mouth workers is indicated by HTM. In either case, complete markets are indicated
by CM and incomplete markets by IM.
Regardless of speciﬁcation, the marginal eﬀects of higher government spending on capital inten-
sity K/N and labor productivity Y/N are negative under incomplete markets (and are stronger the
higher is g), whereas they are zero under complete markets. As for aggregate employment N, the
wealth eﬀect of higher g turns out to dominate the eﬀect of lower wages under incomplete markets,
so that N increases with higher g under either complete or incomplete markets. However, the
employment stimulus is weaker under incomplete markets, especially in the economy with hand-
26This is true as long as the steady state is unique, which seems to be the case but has not been proved as in the
benchmark model. Also, in the variant with hand-to-mouth agents, we have to be cautious to interpret φ as the ratio
of private equity to eﬀective wealth for the investor population alone.
27We henceforth focus on marginal rather than level eﬀects just to economize on space.
18K/N Y/N N Y τk
equiv
CM IM CM IM CM IM CM IM CM
g = 25% → 26% KPR 0 −0.33 0 −0.12 1.4 1.27 1.4 1.15 0.52
HTM 0 −0.3 0 −0.11 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.27 0.46
g = 40% → 41% KPR 0 −0.52 0 −0.19 1.76 1.53 1.76 1.34 0.68
HTM 0 −0.36 0 −0.13 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.44 0.48
Table 3. Long-run eﬀects with endogenous labor.
to-mouth workers. The same is true for aggregate output: it increases under either incomplete or
complete markets, but less so under incomplete markets. Finally, the incomplete-markets eﬀects
are on average equivalent to what would have been the eﬀect of increasing the tax rate on capital
income by about 0.55% under complete markets.
6 Dynamic responses
The results so far indicate that the long-run eﬀects of government consumption can be signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by incomplete risk sharing. We now examine how incomplete risk sharing aﬀects the entire
impulse response of the economy to a ﬁscal shock.28
Starting from the steady state with g = 25%, we hit the economy with a permanent 1% increase
in government spending. We then trace its transition to the new steady state (the one corresponding
to g = 26%). We conduct this experiment for both the economy with KPR (homothetic) preferences
and the economy with hand-to-mouth workers, each parameterized as in the previous section; in
either case, the transitional dynamics reduce to a simple system of two ﬁrst-order ODE’s in (Kt,Ht)
when θ = 1.29
The results are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Time in years is on the horizontal axis, while
deviations of the macro variables from their respective initial values are on the vertical axis. The
interest rate and the investment rate are in simple diﬀerences, the rest of the variables are in log
diﬀerences. The solid lines indicate incomplete markets, the dashed lines indicate complete markets.
As evident in these ﬁgures, the quantitative eﬀects of a permanent ﬁscal shock can be quite
diﬀerent between complete and incomplete markets. The overall picture that emerges is that the
28Note that the purpose of the quantitative exercises conducted here, and throughout the paper, is not to assess
the ability of the model to match the data. Rather, the purpose is to detect the potential quantitative signiﬁcance
of the particular deviation we took from the standard neoclassical growth model.
29Throughout, we focus on permanent shocks. Clearly, transitory shocks have no impact in the long run. As for
their short-run impact, the diﬀerence between complete and incomplete markets is much smaller than in the case
of permanent shocks. This is simply because transitory shocks have very weak wealth eﬀects on investment as long
as agents can freely borrow and lend over time, which is the case in our model. However, we expect the diﬀerence
between complete and incomplete markets to be larger once borrowing constraints are added to the model, for then
investment will be sensitive to changes in current disposable income even if there is no change in present-value wealth.
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Figure 2. Dynamic responses to a permanent shock with KPR preferences.
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Figure 3. Dynamic responses to a permanent shock with hand-to-mouth agents.
21employment and output stimulus of a permanent increase in government spending is weaker under
incomplete markets than under complete markets. And whereas we already knew this for the
long-run response of the economy, now we see that the same is true for its short-run response.
This picture holds for both the economy with KPR preferences and the one with hand-to-mouth
workers. But there are also some interesting diﬀerences between the two. The mitigating eﬀect
of incomplete markets on the employment and output stimulus of government spending is much
stronger in the economy with hand-to-mouth workers. As a result, whereas the short-run eﬀects of
higher government spending on the investment rate and the interest are positive under complete
markets in both economies, and whereas these eﬀects remain positive under incomplete markets in
the economy with KPR preferences, they turn negative under incomplete markets in the economy
with hand-to-mouth workers.
To understand this result, consider for a moment the benchmark model, where there are no hand-
to-mouth workers and labor supply is completely inelastic. Under complete markets, a permanent
change in government spending would be absorbed one-to-one in private consumption, leaving
investment and interest rates completely unaﬀected in both the short- and the long-run. Under
incomplete markets, instead, investment and the interest rate would fall on impact, as well as in the
long run. Allowing labor supply to increase in response to the ﬁscal shock ensures that investment
and the interest rate jump upwards under complete markets. However, as long as the response of
labor supply is weak enough, the response of investment and the interest rate can remain negative
under incomplete markets.
As a ﬁnal point of interest, we calculate the welfare cost, in terms of consumption equivalent,
associated with a permanent 1% increase in government spending. Under complete markets, welfare
drops by 0.2%, whereas under incomplete markets it drops by 0.6%. In other words, the welfare
cost of an increase in government spending is three times higher under incomplete markets than
under complete markets.30
To recap, the quantitative results presented here indicate that a modest level of uninsured
idiosyncratic investment risk can have a non-trivial impact on previously reported quantitative
evaluations of ﬁscal policy. Note in particular that our quantitative economy with KPR preferences
is directly comparable to two classics in the related literature, Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) and Baxter and King (1993). Therefore, further investigating the macroeconomic eﬀects of
ﬁscal shocks in richer quantitative models with ﬁnancial frictions appears to be a promising direction
for future research.
30Here we have assumed that government consumption has no welfare beneﬁt, but this should not be taken literally:
nothing changes if Gt enters separably in the utility of agents.
227 Conclusion
This paper revisits the macroeconomic eﬀects of government consumption in an incomplete-markets
version of the neoclassical growth model. Incomplete markets make individual investment sensitive
to individual wealth for given prices. It follows that an increase in government spending can crowd-
out private investment simply by reducing disposable income. As a result, market incompleteness
can seriously upset the supply-side eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks: an increase in government consumption,
even if ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxation, tends to reduce capital intensity, labor productivity, and
wages in both the short-run and the long-run. For plausible parameterizations of the model, these
results appear to have not only qualitative but also quantitative content.
These results might, or might not, be bad news for the ability of the neoclassical paradigm to
explain the available evidence regarding the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks. However, the
goal of this paper was not to study the ability of an incomplete-market variant of the neoclassical
growth model to match the relevant data. Rather, the goal was to identify a mechanism through
which incomplete markets modify the response of the economy to ﬁscal shocks.
This mechanism was the dependence of individual investment on individual wealth. In our
model, this property originated from uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk combined with dimin-
ishing absolute risk aversion. Borrowing constraints would lead to similar sensitivity of investment
to wealth (or cash ﬂow). Also, this mechanism need not depend on whether prices are ﬂexible (as
in the neoclassical paradigm) or sticky (as in the Keynesian paradigm). The key insights of this
paper are thus clearly more general than the speciﬁc model we employed—but the quantitative
importance of these insights within richer models of the macroeconomy is an open question.
An important aspect left outside our analysis is the optimal ﬁnancing of government expendi-
tures. In this paper, as in much of the related literature, we assumed that the increase in government
spending is ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxation, only because we wished to isolate wealth eﬀects from
tax distortions. Suppose, however, that the government has access to two tax instruments, a lump-
sun tax and a proportional income tax.31 Suppose further that the government chooses taxes so
as to maximize ex ante utility (equivalently, a utilitarian welfare criterion) subject to its budget
constraint. Clearly, with complete markets (and no inequality) it would be optimal to ﬁnance any
exogenous increase in government spending with only lump-sum taxes. With incomplete markets,
however, it is likely that an increase in government spending is ﬁnanced with a mixture of both
instruments: while using only the lump-sum tax would disproportionately aﬀect the utility of poor
agents, using both instruments permits the government to trade oﬀ less eﬃciency for more equality.
Further exploring these issues is left for future research.
31As in Werning (2006), this might be a good proxy for more general non-linear tax schemes.
238 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let J(w,t) denote the value function for the household’s problem.
The value function depends on time t because of discounting as well as because the price sequence
{ωt,Rt}t∈[0,∞) need not be stationary. However, the value function does not depend on i, because
households have identical preferences, they have access to the same technology, and they face
the same sequence of prices and the same stochastic process for idiosyncratic risk. The Bellman


















The ﬁrst term of the Bellman equation (25) captures utility from current-period consumption; the
second term takes care of discounting and the non-stationarity in prices; the third term captures
the impact of the mean growth in wealth; and the last term (Itˆ o’s term) captures the impact of
risk.
Because of the CRRA/CEIS speciﬁcation of preferences, an educated guess is that there exists
a deterministic process Bt such that
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The ﬁrst order condition for φ gives
φt =
¯ rt − Rt
γσ2 , (29)
















This ODE, together with the relevant transversality condition, determines the process for Bt. Using




= mt + (θ − 1)ˆ ρt − θβ,
which is the Euler condition (13).
Proof of Proposition 2. Since aggregate labor demand is
 
i ni
t = ¯ n(ωt)Kt and aggregate
labor supply is 1, the labor market clears if and only if ¯ n(ωt)Kt = 1. It follows that the equilibrium
wage satisﬁes ωt = FL (Kt,1) and, similarly, the equilibrium mean return to capital satisﬁes ¯ rt =
FK (Kt,1) − δ. The bond market, on the other hand, clears if and only if 0 = (1 − φt)Wt + Ht.
Combining this with Kt = φtWt gives condition (17).
Combining the intertemporal government budget with the deﬁnition of human wealth, we get





t Rjdj(ωs − Gs)ds. (31)
Expressing this in recursive form gives condition (16).
Combining the latter with Kt + Ht = Wt and ˙ Wt = ρWt − Ct, we have ˙ Kt = ˙ Wt − ˙ Ht =
(ρtWt − Ct) − (RtHt − ωt + Gt). Using ρtWt = ¯ rtφtWt + Rt (1 − φt)Wt = ¯ rtKt + RtHt, we get
˙ Kt = ¯ rtKt +ωt −Ct −Gt. Together with the fact, in equilibrium, ¯ rtKt +ωt = F (Kt,1)−δKt, this
gives condition (14), the resource constraint.
Finally, using Ct = mtWt, and therefore ˙ Ct/Ct = ˙ mt/mt + ˙ Wt/Wt together with ˙ Wt = ρtWt −
Ct = (ρt − mt)Wt and (13), gives condition (15), the aggregate Euler condition.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we derive the two equations characterizing the steady state
K and R. In steady state, the Euler condition gives
0 = θ(ρ − β) − (θ − 1) 1
2γσ2φ2,
where
ρ = R +
[f′ (K) − δ − R]
2
γσ2 and φ =
f′(K) − δ − R
γσ2 .
Combining and solving for f′(K) gives condition (18). Condition (19), on the other hand, follows
directly from (16) and (17).
Next, we prove existence and uniqueness of the steady state. Let  (R) and φ(R) denote,











Note that  ′(R) < 0 and φ′(R) < 0. Next, let K (R) denote the solution to (18), or equivalently
K(R) =
 













This represents the ratio of the net foreign asset position to domestic capital of an open economy
that faces an exogenous interest rate R ∈ (0,β). (Note that we have used ω = (1 − α)Y, G = gY,
and Y = f(K) = Kα, where α > 0,g ≥ 0, and α + g < 1.) To establish existence and uniqueness
of the steady state (for the closed economy), it suﬃces to show that there exists a unique R that
solves D(R;g) = 0.
Fix g henceforth, and consider the limits of D as R → 0+ and R → β−. Note that  (0) =
(
2θγσ2
1+θ β)1/2 is ﬁnite and hence both φ(0) and K(0) are ﬁnite. It follows that
lim







+ 1 = +∞.
Furthermore,  (β) = 0, implying φ(β) = 0 and K(β) = Kcompl ≡ (f′)
−1 (β) is ﬁnite. It follows
lim






+ 1 = −∞.
These properties, together with the continuity of D(R) in R, ensure the existence of an R ∈ (0,β)
such that D(R) = 0.
If we now show that D(R;g) is strictly decreasing in R, then we also have uniqueness. To show
this, note that from (33),
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Since  ′ (R) < 0 and R < f′(K (R)) for all R ∈ (0,β), we have that ∂D/∂R < 0 for all R ∈ (0,β),
which completes the argument.
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that (18) is equivalent to
θ(ρ − β) − (θ − 1)γφ2σ2 = 0,




















On the other hand, from (19), using φ = (f′(K) − R)/γσ2, f′(K) = αKα−1 and ω − G =



















which proves that ∂K2/∂R < 0 always.
Proof of Proposition 4. From (33), we have that ∂D/∂g < 0. Together with the property
that ∂D/∂R < 0, this implies that the steady-state R necessarily decreases with g. The impact of
g on the steady-state K then follows from the fact that K1 (R), deﬁned by (18), does not depend
on g and is increasing/decreasing in R if and only if θ is higher/lower than φ/(1 − φ).
27References
A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Y., Parker, J. A., M. Yogo (2001), “Luxury Goods and the Equity Premium, ” NBER,
Working Paper 8417.
Aiyagari, S. R. (1994), “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 109, 659-684.
Aiyagari, S. R., Christiano, L., and M. Eichenbaum (1992), “The Output, Employment, and
Interest Rate Eﬀects of Government Consumption,” Journal of Monetary Economics 30, 73-
86.
Angeletos, G.-M. (2007), “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Investment Risk and Aggregate Saving,” Re-
view of Economic Dynamics 10, 1-30.
Angeletos, G.-M., and L.-E. Calvet (2006), “Idiosyncratic Production Risk, Growth, and the
Business Cycle,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 1095-1115.
Barro, R. J. (1981), “Output Eﬀects of Government Purchases,” Journal of Political Economy 89,
1086-1121.
Barro, R. J. (1989), “The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deﬁcits,” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 3, 37-54.
Baxter, M., and R. G. King (1993), “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium,” American Economic
Review 83, 315-334.
Blundell, R., and T. MaCurdy (1999), “Labour Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches,”
Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds).
Buera, F., and T. Shin (1999), “Financial Frictions and the Persistence of History: a Quantitative
Exploration,” Working Paper.
Cagetti, M., and M. De Nardi (2006), “Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth,” Journal of
Political Economy 114, 835-870.
Campbell, J., and N.G. Mankiw (1989), “Permanent Income, Current Income, and Consumption,”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989.
Card, D. (1990), “Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment,” Princeton University, Working
Paper 269.
Carroll, C. (2000), “Portfolios of the Rich,” NBER, Working Paper 430.
Christiano, L. J., and M. Eichenbaum (1992), “Current Real-Business-Cycle Theories and Aggre-
gate Labor Market Fluctuations,” American Economic Review 82, 430-450.
28Covas, F. (2006), “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Production Risk with Borrowing Constraints,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 2167-2190.
Duﬃe, D., and L. G. Epstein (1992), “Stochastic Diﬀerential Utility,” Econometrica 60, 353-394.
Gentry, W. M., and R. G. Hubbard (2000), “Entrepreneurship and Household Saving,” NBER,
working paper 7894.
Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., and G. Huﬀman (1988), “Investment, Capacity Utilization and the
Real Business Cycle,” American Economic Review 78, 402-417.
Gruber, J. (2005), “A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution,” NBER,
working paper 11945.
Guvenen, F. (2006), “Reconciling Conﬂicting Evidence on the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substi-
tution: A Macroeconomic Perspective,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 1451-1472.
Hall, R. (1980), “Stabilization Policy and Capital Formation,” American Economic Review 70,
156-63.
Hall, R. (1988), “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” Journal of Political Economy 96,
339-357.
Hausman, J. (1981), “Labor Supply: How taxes aﬀect Economic Behavior,” Tax and the Economy,
H. Aaron and J. Pechman (eds.), Brookings Institute, Washigton DC.
Heathcote, J. (2005), “Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Incomplete Markets,” Review
of Economic Studies 72, 161-188.
Huggett, M. (1997), “The One-Sector Growth Model With Idiosyncratic Shocks,” Journal of
Monetary Economics 39, 385-403.
Jaimovich, N., and S. Rebelo (2006), “Can News About the Future Drive the Business Cycle?, ”
NBER, Working Paper 12537.
King, R. G., and S. Rebelo (1990), “Public Policy and Economic Growth: Developing Neoclassical
Implications,” Journal of Political Economy 98, S126-S150.
King, R. G., Plosser, C., and S. Rebelo (1988), “Production, Growth and Business Cycles: I. the
Basic Neoclassical Model,” Journal of Monetary Economics 21, 195-232.
Krusell, P., and A.A. Smith (1998), “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy,”
Journal of Political Economy 106, 867-896.
MaCurdy, T. (1981), “An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting,” Journal of
Political Economy 86, 1059-1085.
29Malloy, C. J., Moskowitz, T. J., and A. Vissing-Jørgensen (2006), “Long Run Stockholder Con-
sumption Risk and Asset Returns,” Working Paper.
Mankiw, G. N., Rotemberg, J., and L. H. Summers (1985), “Intertemporal Substitution in Macroe-
conomics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1059-1085.
Mankiw, G. N., and S. P. Zeldes (1991), “The Consumption of Stockholders and Nonstockholders,”
Journal of Financial Economics 29, 97-112.
McGrattan, E., and L. E. Ohanian (1999), “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Big Fiscal Shocks: The
Case of World War II,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper 599.
McGrattan, E., and L. E. Ohanian (2006), “Does Neoclassical Theory Account for the Eﬀects
of Big Fiscal Shocks: Evidence from World War II,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
Research Department Staﬀ Report 315.
Meh, C., and V. Quadrini (2006), “Endogenous Market Incompleteness with Investment Risks,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 2143-2165.
Moskowitz, T., and A. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), “The Returns to Entrepreneurial Investment: A
Private Equity Premium Puzzle?,” American Economic Review 92, 745-778.
Mulligan, C. (2002), “Capital, Interest, and Aggregate Intertemporal Substitution,” NBER Work-
ing Paper 9373.
Obstfeld, M. (1994), “Risk-Taking, Global Diversiﬁcation, and Growth,” American Economic
Review 84, 1310-1329.
Quadrini, V. (2000), “Entrepreneurship, Saving, and Social Mobility,” Review of Economic Dy-
namics 3, 1-40.
Vissing-Jørgensen, A. (2002), “Limited Asset Market Participation and the Elasticity of Intertem-
poral Substitution,” Journal of Political Economy 110, 825-853.
Vissing-Jørgensen, A., and O. Attanasio (2003), “Stock-Market Participation, Intertemporal Sub-
stitution, and Risk Aversion,” American Economic Review 93, 383-391.
Werning, I. (2006), “Optimal Fiscal Policy with Redistribution, ” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
forthcoming.
30